Sales--Factors\u27 Act--Pledge of Ring with Pawnbroker by Dealer to Whom It Was Delivered by Another Dealer on Memorandum (Morris H. Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 286 N.Y. 450 (1941)) by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 16 
Number 2 Volume 16, April 1942, Number 2 Article 14 
July 2013 
Sales--Factors' Act--Pledge of Ring with Pawnbroker by Dealer to 
Whom It Was Delivered by Another Dealer on Memorandum 
(Morris H. Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 286 N.Y. 450 (1941)) 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1942) "Sales--Factors' Act--Pledge of Ring with Pawnbroker by Dealer to Whom It 
Was Delivered by Another Dealer on Memorandum (Morris H. Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 286 N.Y. 450 
(1941))," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 16 : No. 2 , Article 14. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol16/iss2/14 
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tests, the court holding that the evidence in the application was im-
material. The bare allegations that the Texas corporation had dis-
continued operations, and that the refinery was taken over by the
Delaware corporation whose stockholders were never stockholders
of the Texas corporation, did not negative the possibility that the
stock in the Delaware corporation represented but an insubstantial
part of its total capitalization, with the balance and real control held
by the Texas corporation or by nominal or "dummy" holders. Op-
eration might have been carried on under a disguise intended to evade
the order, without any change of actual ownership, or any bonvz fide
dissolution. At any rate, these matters were addressed to the discre-
tion of the reviewing court and this court has found that the allega-
tions in the petitioner's application did not overcome these possi-
bilities. In addition, the court stated that the Board's order ran not
only to the petitoner, but also to its "officers, agents, successors and
assigns", 7 and in view of the fact that the petitioner has not shown
that there was a change in its relation to the refinery, the order of
- the Board, even with respect to its affirmative directions, may be
sustained on that ground.
P. F. C.
SALEs-FAcToRs' ACT-PLEDGE OF RING WITH PAWNBROKER
BY DEALER TO WHOM IT WAS DELIVERED BY ANOTHER DEALER ON
MEMoRA-DuM.-One Gouldon, a factor, received a ring from the
plaintiff, a jeweler, under a memorandum agreement which expressly
reserved title in the plaintiff and further provided that title should not
pass until the plaintiff should be apprised of a selection. The factor
pledged the ring with the defendant, a pawnbroker who took the
ring in good faith, and appropriated the proceeds. In an action by
the plaintiff to recover the ring or its value, the Appellate Division'
held that the defendant is precluded from establishing by parol evi-
dence a custom whereby delivery to a factor or agent was for the
purpose of sale and thus to enable the defendant to come within the
protection of the Factors' Act; 2 on the grounds that by adding in his
7This is the usual form of order. See N. L. R. B. v. Link Belt Co., 311
U. S. 584, 61 Sup. Ct 358 (1941) ; N. L. R. B. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
309 U. S. 206, 60 Sup. Ct -493 (1940) ; N. L. R B. v. Falk Corp., 308 U. S.
453, 60 Sup. Ct 307 (1940); N. L. R. B. v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 308 U. S. 241, 60 Sup. Ct 203 (1939) ; Consolidated Edison Co.
v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
1 Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 257 App. Div. 329, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 423
(1st Dep't 1939).
2 N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 43: "Every factor or agent entrusted with the
possession of * * * any merchandise for the puipose of sale * * * shall be the
true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contract made by such
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pleadings that the loan to the factor "was with interest thereon at
pawnbroker's rates", the defendant was asking relief under a com-
mon law lien and was precluded by the parol evidence rule from
changing the unambiguous contract between the plaintiff and the
factor. On appeal, held, judgment reversed in favor of the defendant.
The latter was not claiming a pawnbroker's lien except as that was
given to him by reason of the fact that he had entered into a contract
for a pawnbroker's lien which in turn was made valid by the terms
of the Factors' Law and thereunder evidence of the custom of the
jewelry trade would be admissible in order to prove a custom and
thus entitle the defendant to the protection of the Factors' Act.8
Morris H. Mann v. R. Simpson & Co., Inc., 286 N. Y. 450, 36 N. E.
(2d) 658 (1941).
This decision does not change the general law as expounded by
the Appellate Division. The Factors' Act must still be pleaded af-
firmatively in order to come within the protection thereof.4 The rule
remains that one claiming under a pawnbroker's lien necessarily re-
lies on the memorandum contract, hence makes himself a privy thereto
and thus cannot prove by parol evidence a custom which would over-
rule the intentions of the parties expressed in an unambiguous paperY
The Court of Appeals merely held that the defendant in this case was
not seeking relief under a pawnbroker's lien at all, but that his cause
of action complied with the Factors' Act. In other words, although
the defendant's contract with Gouldon was at pawnbroker's rates it
was not inconsistent with the Factors' Act. Thereby the court ap-
proved one former decision,6 and distinguished the present one from
another 7 upon which the plaintiff had relied.
The Factors' Act was enacted in order to protect third parties
agent with any other person, for the sale or disposition of * * * such merchan-
dise for any money advanced * * * upon the faith thereof."3 Nelkin v. Provident Loan Soc. of N. Y., 265 N. Y. 393, 193 N. E. 245
(1934).4 See note 3, spra.
5 Green v. Wachs, 254 N. Y. 437, 173 N. E. 575 (1930); Arnold v. Fein-
gold, 148 Misc. 442, 265 N. Y. Supp. 876 (1933).
6 See note 3, szpra. The court in that case held that the rule of evidence
which makes a written contract conclusive proof of what the parties have
agreed upon and which rejects parol proof to vary or contradict the
writing does not apply to one who takes nothing under the contract either as a
party or as privy. The consignee there was held to be an agent entrusted with
the merchandise for the purpose of sale within the intendment of the Factors'
Act and therefore, though he had no authority, as in this case, from his prin-
cipal to pledge, his act is so far validated by statute that the one holding
through him is protected and the principal may not reclaim the merchandise
unless he repays the price paid by the innocent party as pledgee or purchaser.
7 See note 5, supra. The cour in this case, as also did the court in the
Nelkin case referred to in note 4, points out that the reason the defendant in
the Green v. Wachs case did not succeed upon similar facts was for the reason
that he did not plead the Factors' Act affirmatively. Since he had claimed a
pawnbroker's lien he was bound by the written contract and oral evidence of a
custom was properly not allowed.
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who, in good faith, incur obligations or advance money in reliance
upon the apparent ownership of merchandise entrusted to a factor
for the purpose of sale.8 This was unknown to the common law.9
Under the latter the factor came within the doctrine of the law of
property that no one can give away what he does not own. 10 Some-
times the situation of third parties was alleviated by the doctrine of
estoppel, but in order to give rise to an estoppel, it is essential that
the party estopped shall have made a representation and that someone
shall have acted on the faith of this representation in such a way that
the innocent party cannot withdraw from the transaction without
damage." Thus trade was hampered to no small degree.' 2
Under the Factors' Act the burden of precaution is placed upon
the principal who entrusts his goods to another. 13 At the same time
the rule is not one-sided; the Act applies only where the relation of
the principal and agent exists between the owner and the one having
the merchandise or documentary evidence of title thereof in his pos-
session with actual authority to sell or pledge the merchandise.14
Thus a mere bailee without authority to sell or pledge does not come
within the purview of the statute.15 In a case such as the above it
would seem that the only way to prove authority to sell or to pledge
is by oral evidence. The admissibility of oral evidence is justified
upon the ground that the defendant asserts no right under the written
contract, but that his defense is built upon the rights given an inno-
cent pledgee by the Factors' Act.16 The Factors' Act by statute
makes valid a contract which without such Act would have been in-
valid, because the agent in such cases as the one above had breached
the authority conferred upon him by the principal.' 7
I.T.
USURY-CONDITIONAL SALES AGREEMENT-EXTENSION AGREE-
MENT.-Plaintiff sues in equity to have certain transactions with the
defendant involving conditional sales agreements declared usurious
and void. On November 6, 1935, plaintiff and defendant entered into
8 Freudenheim v. Gutter, 201 N. Y. 94, 94 N. E. 640 (1911).
9 Smith v. Clews, 114 N. Y. 190, 21 N. E. 640 (1911).
10 WILLISTiON, SALES (2d ed.) § 311.
11 Id. § 312.
127 HoLDsWORT, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed.) 510.
'3 Cartwright v. Wilmerding, 24 N. Y. 521 (1862).
'4 N. Y. Security & Trust Co. v. Lippman, 157 N. Y. 551, 52 N. E. 595(1899).
15 Schwab v. Oatman (rev'd on other grounds) 198 N. Y. 545, 92 N. E.
1101.
16 See note 4, mipra.
'1 See note 3, supra.
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